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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
bargaining table treats the other unfairly. The same thought has
been expressed in a similar manner by Robert D. Leiter in the
Labor Law Journal1 3 where he observed:
"The N.L.R.B. has held that if a union is engaged in an
activity which is not consistent with the act, it does not meet
the test of bargaining in good faith; such bargaining requires
reasoned decisions and balanced relations. It noted that good
faith at the bargaining table is generally a relative matter
and that the lack of good faith in one party may remove the
possibility of negotiation and preclude the existence of a
situation in which the other parties good faith can be tested."
The majority of course, see no distinction between the facts
here involved and those that exist when a strike is in progress.
The distinction, however, appears to be this. Since many strikes
are valid, economic expediency requires that the parties bargain
in an effort to resolve differences. Under the circumstances here
involved, economic expediency does not control and since the union
has moved itself outside the periphery of good faith bargaining,
the employer can take the position that he will not continue to
bargain until the union stops its harassing tactics or goes out on
a true strike. No valid strike was employed by the union in the
Textile Workers case.14 It is submitted, that recognizing the afore-
mentioned difference between harassing tactics and a valid strike,
such union conduct should have been enjoined as bad faith col-
lective bargaining.
RICHARD GLEN GREENWOOD
Real Estate Broker: Entitlement to Commission After Buyer
Defaults Purchase Contract-Defendants gave plaintiff a standard
broker's listing on their property for $15,900. Three days later,
plaintiff secured an unconditional offer of $15,000 from prospective
buyers, which the defendant-sellers accepted, agreeing to close the
transaction in three months. When the parties met for the closing,
buyers were informed of a judgment docketed against one of the
defendants in the amount of $700. Plaintiff's attorney suggested
an escrow arrangement to cover this amount. The purchasers re-
fused to close under such circumstances and promptly departed.
Plaintiff, unable to induce the parties to close subsequently, de-
manded its commission from the defendants, who refused. Plain-
tiff brought action on its listing agreement in the Civil Court of
Milwaukee County. From a judgment for the defendant, plaintiff
appealed to the Circuit Court. From an order of the Circuit Court
13See Leiter, The Meaning of Collective Bargaining 6 LAB. L. J. 835 (Dec.
1955).
14 See note 1 supra.
[Vol. 41
RECENT DECISIONS
affirming the trial court, plaintiff appealed. Held: judgment re-
versed for plaintiff. When a real estate broker is employed under
a standard listing contract, in which payment of the commission
is not contingent on completion of the sale, he is entitled to his
commission when a valid contract is entered into between the
parties. The fact that the purchaser defaults' under such an execu-
tory sales contract does not affect the broker's right to his com-
mission. Wauwatosa Realty Co. v. Paar, 274 Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 2d 125
(1956).
The listing contract, basis of the plaintiff's claim, contained
the following clause:
"If a sale or exchange is made or a purchaser procured
therefor by you, by the undersigned, or by any other, at the
price and upon the terms specified herein, or at any other
terms and price accepted by the undersigned, during the life
of this contract, or if sold or exchanged within six (6) months
after the termination hereof to anyone with whom you nego-
tiated during the life of this contract and whose name you
have filed with me in writing prior to the termination of
this contract, the undersigned agrees to pay you a commis-
sion of five percent (5%o) of the sale price."
No question of the sufficiency of the commission contract under
Sec. 240.10, Wis. Stats. is presented by the case.
It is well settled that the phrase, "If a sale or exchange is
made or a purchaser procured therefor by you," simply means
that the broker must produce a buyer ready, willing, and able to
purchase upon the terms specified by the owner in the listing
contract. 2 The question is, WHEN must such readiness, willing-
ness, and ability of the buyer be present. The lower courts held
that the broker had not performed because the buyers proved un-
willing to close the deal. They proceeded on the theory that the
buyer's readiness, willingness, and ability had to exist until com-
pletion of the transaction. They held, in effect, that consummation
of the sale is implied in every standard listing contract. They made
no mention of the Massachusetts rule adopted in most states and
enunciated in 73 A.L.R. 927.3
'A lien which may be paid out of the purchase money simultaneously with the
delivery of the deed does not make an otherwise perfect title unmarketable.
Woodman v. Blue Grass Land Co., 125 Wis. 489, 103 N.W. 236 (1905), 104
N.W. 920. Seller's failure to show title free of the judgment lien on the
closing date would not, therefore, justify purchaser's declaration of rescission
in the principal case. Droppers v. Hand, 208 Wis. 681, 242 N.W. 483 (1932).
2 Grinde v. Chapman, 175 Wis. 376, 185 N.W. 288 (1921).
3 Earlier annotation at 51 A.L.R. 1394. It may be generally stated that when
a real estate broker procures a purchaser who is accepted by the owner, and
a valid cotract is drawn up between them, the commission for finding such
purchaser is earned, although the buyer later defaults for no known reason.
Louisiana and Rhode Island contra.
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The Supreme Court, by rejecting the implied condition of con-
summation, differentiates between standard listing agreements and
those calling for closing of the sale prior to broker's payment. This
differentiation is not foreign to Wisconsin law. As early as 1921, 4
the Supreme Court recognized the distinction. Its importance lies
in the different performance required of the broker. As stated pre-
viously, where consummation is a condition precedent to payment,
the procured buyer must be ready, willing, and able up until the
time for closing. The broker operating under a standard listing,
however, need only procure a buyer who is ready, willing, and
able to enter into a valid contract upon the terms specified by the
owner in the listing. Once he has succeeded in having the parties
contract, the broker under a standard listing has fully performed,
because the buyer's readiness, willingness, and ability is no longer
open to question. 5
The decision, although amply supported by precedent, seems
a harsh one; and should be applied to broker's commission cases
generally only with extreme caution.
It should be noted that the sale contract, negotiated by the
plaintiff, was unconditional. 6 The writer is unprepared to state
that the principal case would control a conditional contract, es-
pecially if the purchaser's default prevented the condition from
occurring.
Although a broker, using a standard listing, may be entitled
to his commission upon the settling of the contract to sell, such
entitlement is subject to the familiar requirements of fidelity,
loyalty, and full disclosure.7 Failure on the part of the broker to
reveal facts known to him which would suggest probability of sub-
sequent default by the buyer might well raise such an issue, absent
in the principal case.
The two standard form interim land contracts used in typical
real estate transactions, s specify forfeiture of buyer's down pay-
4 Dean v. Wendenberg, 175 Wis. 513, 185 N.W. 514 (1921.)
5 12 C.J.S. 85. The general rule is that the broker must show buyer ready,
willing, and able to take property and this he must prove where the seller
refuses to enter into a valid enforceable contract with the buyer. This general
rule is subject to the exception that no such proof is required on part of
broker where he acts in good faith and the principal accepts his customer and
enters into a contract with him; because in such case the question of the
customer's readiness, willingness, and ability is no longer open to question.
0 Interim land contracts, negotiated by brokers, are frequently conditioned on
the buyer's ability to secure financing.
Hustad v. Drives, 181 Wis. 87, 193 N.W. 984 (1923).
s The H. Niedecken Co. executory sale contract forms, presently in use, are
numbered 166 and 168. Wisconsin Legal Blank Co. publishes two improved
property forms, one of which, number 824, is substantially identical with
Niedecken No. 168, and the second number-994 omits the novation clause,
and is otherwise equivalent.
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ment upon his default. In addition, one form contains a novation
which would appear to modify the commission provisions of the
listing contractY The listing agreement, on which plaintiff in the
principal case based its claim, recites:
"All deposits made shall be retained by you in a trust
account. If forfeited by the buyer, said monies shall first
pay for cash advancements made by you; one-half the bal-
ance, but not in excess of the commission agreed upon, shall
belong to you. The balance shall belong to the undersigned."
The significance of this clause was not argued in briefs of
counsel, and the Court makes no mention of it in its decision. It
is suggested that such clause might reasonably have been con-
strued as limiting the commission, in event of purchaser-default,
to one-half of the forfeited earnest money. If so construed, the
limitation would be far more liberal toward the seller than is the
standard novation clause, cited at note 9, supra. Certainly it would
be unreasonable to construe the clause so as to give broker one-half
of the forfeited deposit in addition to his full commission. The
absence of any express limitation in the plaintiff's listing contract
would not authorize such unreasonable construction, especially in
view of the rule that doubtful provisions of contracts are construed
most strictly against the party who drew the contract.10
It is unfortunate that the matter of the buyer's $1000 down
payment was not put in issue." Future actions, however, based
on similar facts will undoubtedly involve the application of for-
feitures to any commissions claimed. Inasmuch as such application
may still result in the seller's personal liability for a balance of the
commission, it is suggested that Sec. 240.10, Wis. Stats., be
amended so as to limit the broker's commission in buyer default
cases to the amount of the forfeited down payment, or the amount
provided in the commission agreement, whichever is smaller.
ROBERT CHOINSKI
Class Gifts: Time When Class Closes-Rule of Convenience-
Testator left a will bequeathing to his grandchildren the sum of
fifty thousand dollars in trust. The income from the principal was
9 Offer to Purchase form No. 168 ibid., incorporates the following clause in the
seller's acceptance: "For and in consideration of the services furnished, the
undersigned agrees to pay to- as commission, the sum of $ -
and in the event the deposit made by the buyer shall be forfeit, such deposit
shall first apply to your commission; the balance, if any, shall belong to the
undersigned. In such event, the commission shall not exceed the deposit."
10 Deree v. Reliable Tool & Machine, Inc., 250 Wis. 224, 26 N.W. 2d 673 (1947).
"' A reading of the cases and briefs disclosed both the amount of the down
payment and the fact that it was returned to the buyers. The sellers presently
have an action pending against the plaintiff for recovery of the down pay-
ment.
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